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 Re-Imagining Regulatory 
Approaches for Methane Emissions 
 
Jongeun You 




Recently, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) took a step-back 
in regulating the methane released during natural gas extraction. In June 
2016, the EPA issued the first federal regulations on methane, estimating 
methane emissions would decrease by a total of 510,000 short tons in 2025, 
with a potential net benefit of $160 million. Yet, in October 2018, the EPA 
released a new proposal that weakened the 2016 methane rules, estimating 
methane emissions would increase by a total of 380,000 short tons in 2025, 
with a potential saving of $484 million. This paper explores the EPA’s 
drastic change between 2016 and 2018 by using a multiple lenses approach 
to shine a light on different aspects of the methane output problem and policy 
change. The paper concludes by arguing that the EPA needs to strengthen 
the role and responsibility of state governments to control methane 
emissions before finalizing the proposed methane rule. 
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ecently increasing methane in the atmosphere stemming from human 
activity contributes to climate change. This paper discusses methane 
policy implications based on two presidential administrations. Opening with 
a discussion of the EPA’s shift in policy from 2016 to 2018, the paper offers 
an analysis of the notion that elections matter in directing what an agency 
does. These changes are also understood by using the concept of public 
service bargaining. In addition, several empirical studies are examined. The 
author highlights the politically motivated shift in EPA policies, looking first 
at the policy roll out during the Obama-era and then the impacts of the policy 
halt by the Trump administration. The final two sections evaluate three 
options available to the EPA: 1) modifying a communication strategy,  
2) strengthening the role and responsibility of state governments, and  
3) expanding the EPA’s direct engagement in the monitoring industry. This 
paper concludes by recommending that the EPA needs to reimagine its 






Methane is the prime constituent of natural gas, which accounts for 10 
percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions (see Figure 1). It has been 
responsible for 20 percent of global warming since the pre-industrial era.1 The 
rise in atmospheric methane has become more significant since 2006 mainly 
due to fossil fuel use.2 Methane is at least 25 times more potent at trapping 
heat than carbon dioxide.3 Moreover, methane emissions that are associated 
with increased shale gas development in the U.S. have an even larger effect 
on greenhouse gas emissions domestically and internationally.4 Worse, 
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Figure 1. Trends in U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 1990-2017 in Million Metric 
Tonnes of Carbon Dioxide Equivalents MMT CO2. 
6 
 
Over the last three decades, petroleum and natural gas systems accounted 
for 32 percent of U.S. methane emissions (see Figure 2), which are primarily 
associated with oil and natural gas production, processing, and transportation. 
Moreover, methane emissions from U.S. oil and gas operations are 60 percent 
higher than the EPA’s estimate, suggesting methane loss due to leaks equals 
about 13 million metric tons of natural gas, enough to heat 10 million U.S. 
homes.7 Managing the methane that escapes the oil and gas supply chain is 
critical to climate and health policies. 
 
Figure 2. Trends in U.S. Methane Emissions, 1990-2017 
 
Source: created by the author using data from EPA, 2019.8  
Note: Others include industrial process, wastewater treatment, and land-use change. 
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In August 2015, the EPA proposed the first federal limits on methane, 
aiming to cut methane emissions from the oil and gas sector by 40 to 45 
percent by 2025, compared with 2012 levels. After the agency received more 
than 900,000 comments, they updated many aspects and issued the final rule 
in June 2016, called New Source Performance Standards (NSPS). The EPA 
estimated the rule would cost companies about $530 million by 2025 but 
would save companies $690 million from reduced waste, creating a potential 
net benefit of $160 million. Additionally, the agency also expected to reduce 
510,000 short tons of methane in 2025, the equivalent of cutting 11 million 
metric tons of carbon dioxide.9 Then-EPA administrator Gina McCarthy said, 
“Together these new actions will protect public health and reduce pollution 
linked to cancer and other serious health effects while allowing the industry 
to continue to grow.”10 
 
The EPA under the Trump administration, however, rolled back the 
Obama-era rule. In April 2017, the EPA imposed a 90-day moratorium on the 
NSPS, which they later extended to two years, delaying the rule’s effective 
date. Then, the EPA faced challenges in Federal court. For instance, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled on 
July 3, 2017, that the EPA could not suspend the methane regulation since the 
EPA does not have authority to amend a rule with their order. On October 15, 
2018, the EPA issued a new proposal that relaxed requirements for energy 
companies, thus making it easier for oil and gas companies to release 
methane.11 For example, according to the 2016 rule, oil and gas drillers were 
required to conduct leak inspections on their drilling equipment every six 
months, and fix methane leaks within 30 days. Now, the newly proposed 
methane rules allow companies to perform a leak inspection once a year and 
give 60 days to fix leaks.  
 
The EPA’s 2018 actions drew praise from energy industry groups, 
including the Independent Petroleum Association of America and the 
American Petroleum Institute. In contrast, environmental groups, such as the 
Environmental Defense Fund and the Sierra Club, criticized the EPA by 
saying they ignored the calls of Americans and only listened to the fossil fuel 
industry. 
 
The policy shift is problematic for citizens for two reasons. First, the EPA 
quickly reversed their 2015 findings, decreasing policy predictability and 
eroding public trust in the EPA. Second, the detrimental impacts of methane, 
which were previously defined and acknowledged by the EPA, were 
neglected, allowing methane to harm the environment and affect public health 
more severely.  
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Creating a politically driven policy, along with the politicization of the 
EPA, results in major consequences for the climate and citizen health. 
Therefore, a new way of examining the EPA rule is necessary. Several 
theories can be used to understand the issue and identify three alternative 
options available to the EPA. 
 
 
Understanding the Problem 
 
The author provides a multi-lens interpretation of this case to understand 
better the EPA’s drastic position change. The Wilsonian (1887) and Weberian 
(1905) beliefs argue that public administrators are nothing more than faithful 
enforcers of the elected officials.12 This politics-administration dichotomy 
model provides a high degree of political comfort to the EPA, stressing values 
such as efficiency, effectiveness, and economy.13 Scholars find that 
institutionally separating administration from politics offers values in a 
system of checks and balances. This also sustains government discretion and 
accountability.14  
 
However, public agencies, including the EPA, not only deliver services 
but also serve as a source of political influence on public policy. It is 
unreasonable to assume that administration can be separated from politics.15 
Administrators’ self-expectation is one of the key factors in explaining policy 
formulation.16 Indeed, public administrators are regular political participants 
in the policy formulation process.17  
 
Furthermore, political appointees changed the course of the EPA. Capture 
theory suggests that the organized interest group can often influence the 
regulatory process.18 In this instance, the NSPS worked for a year. Yet, on 
March 2, 2017, one day after Republican officials from 11 states petitioned 
then-the EPA administrator Scott Pruitt, complaining the rule added costs and 
paperwork for oil and gas companies, the EPA canceled the requirement for 
reporting methane emissions. The withdrawal was effective immediately, and 
owners and operators in the oil and natural gas industry were no longer 
required to provide information on emissions at existing oil and gas 
operations.19 On April 18, 2017, after lobbyists for the oil and gas industries 
further requested to administrator Pruitt to relax the rule, Pruitt ordered a 
review of the rule limiting methane emissions at new oil and gas drilling 
sites.20 In short, the fossil fuel industry influenced political appointees to 
change the regulatory actions related to methane emissions in favor of the 
industry rather than citizens. 
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The EPA’s situation can also be explained by the idea of public service 
bargain, which is a bargain agreed upon between political and administrative 
leaders.21 President Trump seeks to obtain loyalty from the EPA, and in return, 
the President offers rewards and stability. In this case, EPA Administrator 
(Scott Pruitt and Andrew Wheeler) were motivated to protect their political 
interests over protecting the general interest of the climate and citizen health. 
Indeed, the EPA concentrated on short-term results, which secured jobs and 
burnished their reputation. 
 
In addition, the EPA is limited by bounded rationality, in which 
organizational rationality is constrained by incomplete information, limited 
cognitive capacity, and unclear linkages between decision and outcomes.22 
The regulatory impact analysis (RIA) for the proposed EPA amendments 
estimates that the oil and gas industry would save a total of $380 million to 
$484 million from 2019 through 2025, while increasing methane emissions.23 
However, several studies suggest that real methane emissions are 1.5 to 5.8 
times higher than current EPA estimates.24 In other words, in this new rule, 
the EPA underestimated costs associated with methane emissions. The new 
RIA did not stem from more recent research findings. In designing the 
Obama-era NSPS, the EPA collaborated with researchers and the oil and gas 
industry to warrant evidence-based policymaking. Those researchers found 
that the most substantial five percent of leaks typically contribute to over 50 
percent of the total leakage volume. The studies indicated that these “super 
emissions” are missing from the EPA’s methane database, and provided 
significant new data on methane emitted by existing operations in the oil and 
gas sector.25 Furthermore, researchers concluded that natural gas power plants 
release 21 to 120 times more methane than the EPA estimates, and oil 
refineries’ emission rates are 11 to 90 times more than initial estimates, which 
suggests that the EPA’s decision is not systematically warranted.26 
 
Given that the EPA’s change is politically motivated, through capture 
theory and public service bargain, and limited by bounded rationality, there is 
a need for alternative means to adjust the EPA’s proposed rule.  
 
 
Exploring Alternative Means 
 
According to the EPA’s 2018 baseline estimate under the new proposal, 
methane emissions will increase by a total of 380,000 short tons, over the 2019 
through 2025 timeframe. The new methane rule is expected to save the EPA 
up to $484 million in regulatory costs during this timeframe. The agency held 
a public hearing on the new proposal in November 2018 and will publish a 
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final rule in mid-2019. When considering policy implementation, the 
following section briefly describes three alternative options for the EPA in 
implementing the new rule.  
 
First, the EPA can maintain the status quo, while modifying their 
communication strategy. Currently, the agency takes a hardline stance against 
any changes in the proposed rule. However, the EPA can claim that they will 
reflect opinions from citizens incrementally. The EPA can suggest that they 
have built enough capacity to manage methane emissions. The agency should 
be more assertive about the applicability and practicality of the new rule. At 
the same time, the EPA can emphasize their advocacy for citizens and defend 
themselves by contending that they will proceed through a succession of 
incremental changes.27  
 
Second, the EPA can strengthen the role and responsibility of state 
policies and legislatures. The proposed rule change delegates to the states to 
some extent, but concerning accountability (e.g., corporations are required to 
report to both the EPA and their state government), it has some gray areas. 
Instead, the EPA should actively instruct the state governments regarding 
methane emissions management. In clean air policy, state agencies have more 
policy influence than the EPA. Additionally, administrative procedures affect 
the degree of bureaucratic autonomy.28  
 
Third, the EPA can expand its direct engagement in the monitoring 
industry. Methane-related issues may last for generations, beyond any 
governor’s tenure, which demands institutional constancy.29 State regulations 
change over time depending on state government leadership. Furthermore, 
companies and watchdogs would have to spend significant time researching 
the requirements for regulations in different states. If the EPA is involved 
more in methane policy implementation, concerns from environmental groups 
could be lessened. 
 
The dominant way of thinking about what makes for good governance 
rests on the ability to make practical tradeoffs between values.30 Key criteria 
for evaluating which option is best for the EPA are efficiency, equity, and 
acceptability. 
 
 Efficiency: The ability to control the costs of the policy involved. 
 Equity: Procedural fairness and equal treatment. 
 Acceptability: Acceptance by stakeholders including policy targets and  
         the general public. 
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In the final section, the second recommendation, strengthening the 





This paper recommends strengthening the role and responsibility of state 
governments because it promises to be the most efficient and politically 
acceptable. Although oil and gas methane pollution is an urgent problem, with 
pollutants from the flaring and venting of methane, the political context must 
be considered. The EPA’s new proposal impacts air quality and human health 
negatively, while touting more profits for energy companies, and runs counter 
to procedural fairness. Furthermore, according to Resources for the Future, 
the forgone benefits exceed the cost savings related to repeal.31 At this 
moment, however, the EPA is under considerable institutional constraint 
while current elected officials set the EPA’s direction. The Trump 
administration seeks to secure easily achievable outputs, such as red tape 
cutting and regulatory savings, before the next presidential election. 
According to a report released in October 2018 by the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs, in Fiscal Year 2018, the Trump Administration drew 
attention to $23 billion in regulatory cost savings, which includes methane 
emissions regulations.32  
 
Arguably, governments should only take action in matters where it can 
adequately act on behalf of its citizens.33 However, to the EPA, methane 
emissions control is not inherently a governmental function. In light of this, 
the EPA will not pursue more engagement in regulation. Furthermore, the 
proposed rule with minimal changes may be less acceptable to the general 
public.  
 
Strengthening the role and responsibility of state governments is the most 
feasible alternative for the new EPA rule. In the area of environmental policy, 
several states have moved beyond mere compliance with national 
requirements and have adopted their own important laws and policies.34 
Colorado is a good example. Colorado became the first state in 2014 to require 
companies to find and fix methane leaks from oil and gas drilling.35 Their 
rules have reduced the amount of methane emissions, improved air quality, 
and enhanced profitability and worker safety.36 The case of Colorado shows 
that state governments can effectively control methane emissions. 
 
Before the window of opportunity for changing the 2018 proposal closes 
forever, strengthening the role and responsibility of state governments should 
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be seriously considered. This could fix regulatory pitfalls and help the oil and 
gas industry estimate the methane regulation they would be impacted.37 
Strengthening state governments is the best option because it is the most 





1 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report 
Summary for Policymakers (Geneva: IPCC, 2015), 2-5. 
2 John R. Worden et al., “Emissions reconcile conflicting estimates of the post-2006 atmospheric 
methane budget,” Nature Communications 8, no. 2227 (2017), 2-4. 
3 IPCC, Climate Change 2007 Synthesis Report (Geneva: IPCC, 2015), 36. 
4 Daniel Raimi, The Greenhouse Gas Impacts of Increased US Oil and Gas Production 
(Washington, D.C.: Resource for the Future, 2019), 15-16. 
5 Marcus C. Sarofim, Stephanie T. Waldhoff, and Susan C. Anenberg, “Valuing the Ozone-Related 
Health Benefits of Methane Emission Controls,” Environmental and Resource Economics 66, no. 
1 (2017), 45-63. 
6 EPA (US Environmental Protection Agency), Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Sinks: 1990-2017 (Washington, D.C.: EPA, 2019), ES 6-ES 8. 
7 Ramón A. Alvarez et al., “Assessment of Methane Emissions from the US Oil and Gas Supply 
Chain,” Science 361, no. 6398 (2018), 186-188. 
8 EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2017 (Washington, D.C.: 
EPA, 2019), ES 7. 
9 EPA, “Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified 
Sources,” Federal Register 81, no. 107 (June 3, 2016), 35843-35848, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-06-03/pdf/2016-11971.pdf. 
10 Gina McCarthy, “EPA Taking Steps to Cut Methane Emissions from Existing Oil and Gas 
Sources,” March 10, 2016, https://blog.epa.gov/2016/03/10/epa-taking-steps-to-cut-methane-
emissions-from-existing-oil-and-gas-sources/. 
11 EPA, “Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified 
Sources,” Federal Register 83, no. 199 (October 15, 2018), 52059-52068, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-10-15/pdf/2018-20961.pdf. 
12 Woodrow Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly 2 (1887), 201-203; 
Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (London: 
Unwin Paperbacks, 1985), 48-52. 
You: Re-Imagining Regulations for Methane Emissions
10                 RE-IMAGINING REGULATIONS FOR METHANE EMISSIONS            Vol. 3:2 
 
13 Norma Riccucci, Public Administration: Traditions of Inquiry and Philosophies of Knowledge 
(Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 74. 
14 Patrick J. Wolf, “Neutral and Responsive Competence: The Bureau of the Budget, 1939-1948, 
Revisited,” Administration & Society 31, no. 1 (1999), 146-147. 
15 Tansu Demir, and Ronald C. Nyhan, “The Politics–Administration Dichotomy: An Empirical 
Search for Correspondence between Theory and Practice,” Public Administration Review 68, no. 
1 (2008), 93; Mary E. Guy, “Ties That Bind: The Link between Public Administration and 
Political Science,” The Journal of Politics 65, no. 3 (2003), 652. 
16 Alexandru V. Roman, “The Determinants of Public Administrators’ Participation in Policy 
Formulation,” The American Review of Public Administration 47, no. 1 (2017), 113-114. 
17 James H. Svara, “The Politics-Administration Dichotomy Model as Aberration,” Public 
Administration Review 58, no. 1 (1998), 52-53. 
18 William D. Berry, “An Alternative to the Capture Theory of Regulation: The Case of State Public 
Utility Commissions,” American Journal of Political Science 280, no. 3 (1984), 524-528; Marver 
H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1955), 128. 
19 EPA, “EPA Withdraws Information Request for the Oil and Gas Industry,” March 2, 2017, 
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-withdraws-information-request-oil-and-gas-industry. 
20 EPA, “Actions and Notices about Oil and Natural Gas Air Pollution Standards,” April 18, 2017, 
https://www.epa.gov/controlling-air-pollution-oil-and-natural-gas-industry/actions-and-notices-
about-oil-and-natural-0. 
21 Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge, The Politics of Public Service Bargains: Reward, 
Competency, Loyalty - and Blame (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 2-4.  
22 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in 
Administrative Organization (New York: Macmillan, 1957), 198. 
23 EPA, “Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified 
Sources,” Federal Register 83, no. 199 (October 15, 2018), 52059. 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-10-15/pdf/2018-20961.pdf. 
24 Rober Harriss et al., “Using Multi-Scale Measurements to Improve Methane Emission Estimates 
from Oil and Gas Operations in the Barnett Shale Region, Texas,” Environmental Science & 
Technology 49, no. 13 (2015), 7524-7526; Tegan N. Lavoie et al., “Aircraft-Based Measurements 
of Point Source Methane Emissions in the Barnett Shale Basin,” Environmental Science & 
Technology 49, no. 13 (2015), 7906-7908. 
25 Brandt, Adam R., Garvin A. Heath, and Daniel Cooley, “Methane Leaks from Natural Gas 
Systems Follow Extreme Distributions,” Environmental Science & Technology 50, no. 22 (2016), 
12517. 
Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 4
2019                  THE HATFIELD GRADUATE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS                 11 
 
26 Tegan N. Lavoie et al., “Assessing the Methane Emissions from Natural Gas-Fired Power Plants 
and Oil Refineries,” Environmental Science & Technology 51, no. 6 (2017), 3377-3379. 
27 Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’,” Public Administration Review 19, 
no. 3 (1959), 81-86. 
28 Matthew Potoski and Neal D. Woods. “Designing State Clean Air Agencies: Administrative 
Procedures and Bureaucratic Autonomy,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 
11, no. 2 (2001), 212-215. 
29 H. George Frederickson et al., The Public Administration Theory Primer (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 2016), 82-84.  
30 Brian J. Cook, Bureaucracy and Self-government: Reconsidering the Role of Public 
Administration in American Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 218. 
31 Alan J. Krupnick, Justine Huetteman, and Arthur G. Fraas, EPA’s 2016 Methane Rule: Should It 
Stay or Should It Go? (Washington, D.C.: Resource for the Future, 2018), 1-3. 
32 OIRA (Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs), The 2018 Regulatory Reform Report: 
Cutting the Red Tape (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2018), 3. 
33 Donald Kettl, “From Intergovernmetal to Intersectoral,” in Public Administration Evolving: From 
Foundations to the Future, ed. Mary E. Guy and Marilyn M. Rubin (New York: Routledge, 
2015), 30. 
34 Alka Sapat, “Devolution and Innovation: The Adoption of State Environmental Policy 
Innovations by Administrative Agencies,” Public Administration Review 64, no. 2 (2004), 141. 
35 CDPHE (Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment), “Oil and Gas Air Emissions 
Requirements (Regulation 7 Section XVII),” accessed April 15, 2019, 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cdphe/summary-oil-and-gas-emissions-requirements. 
36 CDPHE, “Air Emissions from Business and Industry,” accessed April 15, 2019, 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cdphe/categories/services-and-information/environment/air-
quality/air-emissions-business-and-industry. 
37 Jongeun You, “Analysis of the Ethical Limitations of an Emissions Trading System Adopting the 





Alvarez, Ramón A., Daniel Zavala-Araiza, David R. Lyon, David T. Allen, Zachary R. Barkley, 
Adam R. Brandt, Kenneth J. Davis, et al. 2018. “Assessment of Methane Emissions from the US 
Oil and Gas Supply Chain.” Science 361, no. 6398 (2018): 186-188. 
Bernstein, Marver H. Regulating Business by Independent Commission. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1955.  
You: Re-Imagining Regulations for Methane Emissions
12                 RE-IMAGINING REGULATIONS FOR METHANE EMISSIONS            Vol. 3:2 
 
Berry, William D. “An Alternative to the Capture Theory of Regulation: The Case of State Public 
Utility Commissions.” American Journal of Political Science 280, no. 3 (1984): 524-558. 
Brandt, Adam R., Garvin A. Heath, and Daniel Cooley. “Methane Leaks from Natural Gas Systems 
Follow Extreme Distributions.” Environmental Science & Technology 50, no. 22 (2016): 12512-
12520. 
CDPHE (Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment). “Oil and Gas Air Emissions 
Requirements (Regulation 7 Section XVII).” Accessed April 15, 2019. 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cdphe/summary-oil-and-gas-emissions-requirements. 
CDPHE. “Air Emissions From Business and Industry.” Accessed April 15, 2019. 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cdphe/categories/services-and-information/environment/air-
quality/air-emissions-business-and-industry. 
Cook, Brian J. Bureaucracy and Self-government: Reconsidering the Role of Public Administration 
in American Politics. Second ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. 
Demir, Tansu, and Ronald C. Nyhan. “The Politics–Administration Dichotomy: An Empirical 
Search for Correspondence between Theory and Practice.” Public Administration Review 68, no. 
1 (2008): 81-96.  
EPA. “Actions and Notices about Oil and Natural Gas Air Pollution Standards.” April 18, 2017, 
https://www.epa.gov/controlling-air-pollution-oil-and-natural-gas-industry/actions-and-notices-
about-oil-and-natural-0. 
———. “EPA Withdraws Information Request for the Oil and Gas Industry.” March 2, 2017, 
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-withdraws-information-request-oil-and-gas-industry. 
———. Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2017. Washington, D.C.: 
EPA, 2019. 
———. “Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified 
Sources.” Federal Register 81, no. 107 (June 3, 2016): 35824-35942. 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-06-03/pdf/2016-11971.pdf. 
———. “Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified 
Sources.” Federal Register 83, no. 199 (October 15, 2018): 52056-52107. 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-10-15/pdf/2018-20961.pdf. 
Frederickson, H. George, Kevin B. Smith, Christopher W. Larimer, and Michael J. Licari. The 
Public Administration Theory Primer. Third ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2016. 
Guy, Mary E. “Ties That Bind: The Link between Public Administration and Political Science.” The 
Journal of Politics 65, no. 3 (2003): 641-655.  
Harriss, Robert, Ramón A. Alvarez, David Lyon, Daniel Zavala-Araiza, Drew Nelson, and Steven P. 
Hamburg. “Using Multi-Scale Measurements to Improve Methane Emission Estimates from Oil 
and Gas Operations in the Barnett Shale Region, Texas.” Environmental Science & Technology 
49, no. 13 (2015): 7524-7526.  
Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 4
2019                  THE HATFIELD GRADUATE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS                 13 
 
Hood, Christopher, and Martin Lodge. The Politics of Public Service Bargains: Reward, 
Competency, Loyalty - and Blame. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report 
Summary for Policymakers. Geneva: IPCC, 2015. 
IPCC. Climate Change 2007 Synthesis Report. Geneva: IPCC, 2008. 
Kettl, Donald. “From Intergovernmetal to Intersectoral.” In Public Administration Evolving: From 
Foundations to the Future, edited by Mary E. Guy and Marilyn M. Rubin, 18-37. New York: 
Routledge, 2015. 
Krupnick, Alan J., Justine Huetteman, and Arthur G. Fraas. EPA’s 2016 Methane Rule: Should It 
Stay or Should It Go? Washington, D.C.: Resource for the Future, 2018. 
Lavoie, Tegan N., Paul B. Shepson, Maria O. L. Cambaliza, Brian H. Stirm, Anna Karion, Colm 
Sweeney, Tara I. Yacovitch, et al. “Aircraft-Based Measurements of Point Source Methane 
Emissions in the Barnett Shale Basin.” Environmental Science & Technology 49, no. 13 (2015): 
7904-7913.  
Lavoie, Tegan N., Paul B. Shepson, Chloe A. Gore, Brian H. Stirm, Robert Kaeser, Bernard Wulle, 
David Lyon, and Joseph Rudek. “Assessing the Methane Emissions from Natural Gas-Fired 
Power Plants and Oil Refineries.” Environmental Science & Technology 51, no. 6 (2017): 3373-
3381. 
Lindblom, Charles E. “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’.” Public Administration Review 19, no. 3 
(1959): 79-88.  
McCarthy, Gina. “EPA Taking Steps to Cut Methane Emissions from Existing Oil and Gas 
Sources.” March 10, 2016, https://blog.epa.gov/2016/03/10/epa-taking-steps-to-cut-methane-
emissions-from-existing-oil-and-gas-sources/. 
OIRA (Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs). The 2018 Regulatory Reform Report: Cutting 
the Red Tape. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2018. 
Potoski, Matthew, and Neal D. Woods. “Designing State Clean Air Agencies: Administrative 
Procedures and Bureaucratic Autonomy.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 
11, no. 2 (2001): 203-221.  
Raimi, Daniel. The Greenhouse Gas Impacts of Increased US Oil and Gas Production. Washington, 
D.C.: Resource for the Future, 2019. 
Riccucci, Norma. Public Administration: Traditions of Inquiry and Philosophies of Knowledge. 
Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2010. 
Roman, Alexandru V. “The Determinants of Public Administrators’ Participation in Policy 
Formulation.” The American Review of Public Administration 47, no. 1 (2017): 102-129.  
Sapat, Alka. “Devolution and Innovation: The Adoption of State Environmental Policy Innovations 
by Administrative Agencies.” Public Administration Review 64, no. 2 (2004): 141-151.  
You: Re-Imagining Regulations for Methane Emissions
14                 RE-IMAGINING REGULATIONS FOR METHANE EMISSIONS            Vol. 3:2 
 
Sarofim, Marcus C., Stephanie T. Waldhoff, and Susan C. Anenberg. “Valuing the Ozone-Related 
Health Benefits of Methane Emission Controls.” Environmental and Resource Economics 66, no. 
1 (2017): 45-63. 
Simon, Herbert A. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in 
Administrative Organization. Second ed. New York: Macmillan, 1957. 
Svara, James H. “The Politics-Administration Dichotomy Model as Aberration.” Public 
Administration Review 58, no. 1 (1998): 51-58.  
Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by Talcott Parsons. 
London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1985. 
Wilson, Woodrow. “The Study of Administration.” Political Science Quarterly 2 (1887): 197-222. 
Wolf, Patrick J. “Neutral and Responsive Competence: The Bureau of the Budget, 1939-1948, 
Revisited.” Administration & Society 31, no. 1 (1999): 142-167.  
Worden, John R., A. Anthony Bloom, Sudhanshu Pandey, Zhe Jiang, Helen M. Worden, Thomas W. 
Walker, Sander Houweling, et al. “Emissions reconcile conflicting estimates of the post-2006 
atmospheric methane budget." Nature Communications 8, no. 2227 (2017): 1-11. 
You, Jongeun. “Analysis of the Ethical Limitations of an Emissions Trading System Adopting the 
Views of Peter Singer.” Virginia Policy Review 10, no. 1 (2017): 14-21. 
 
Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 4
